Thank you very much Thakore. This is a recurrent theme in all contemplative traditions. Upanishads speak about the difference between व्यवहारिक सता (empirical reality) and परमार्थिक सत्ता (underlying reality). Plato describes it as a cave. And now quantum mechanism describes it as consciousness being fundamental. I plan to write about what little I understand and what makes sense to me so far. Thank you so much for engaging.
Even without invoking the brain, the recognition of comorbidity has moved diagnosis from a set of Aristotelian categories to a phenomenological cartography, with fuzzy boundaries between adjacent syndromes.
David, I will be writing at a later stage about the limits we have reached in applying Aristotelian logic to complex problems. Are you reading my mind by any chance?
☺️However, logic has come a long way since Aristotle but is sadly no longer part of a liberal education, so psychiatrists often don’t appreciate what it can do.
Neurologists conceptualize consciousness as comprising two major components: the level of consciousness (arousal or wakefulness) and the content of consciousness (awareness of self and environment). The level of consciousness is regulated by subcortical structures, primarily the ascending reticular activating system in the brainstem and thalamus, which maintain alertness and wakefulness. The content of consciousness is mediated by widespread cortical and subcortical networks that process sensory input, memory, emotion, and executive functions, allowing for perception, attention, and self-awareness.
Clinically, consciousness is assessed by evaluating both arousal (e.g., response to stimuli) and awareness (e.g., purposeful behavior, communication). Disorders of consciousness are classified based on these components, including coma (loss of both arousal and awareness), vegetative state (arousal without awareness), and minimally conscious state (minimal but definite awareness). Recent neuroimaging and electrophysiological studies have identified specific neural correlates and network dynamics underlying conscious states, emphasizing the integration of thalamocortical and frontoparietal circuits.
Neurologists also recognize that consciousness is a dynamic process, with nonlinear transitions and large-scale network interactions, and that both implicit and explicit memory systems contribute to the conscious experience. The distinction between phenomenal consciousness (subjective experience) and access consciousness (reportable, measurable awareness) is central to both clinical and research approaches.
Is this a filed where neurology and psychiatry can collaborate Swaran paaji?
Thank you for such a careful, thoughtful engagement. I agree that clinically and operationally the distinction between arousal and awareness has been enormously useful. It demarcates disorders of consciousness in a clinically relevant manner. Where I would gently diverge is not on the accuracy of this account, but on what it ultimately explains.
Describing neural correlates, network dynamics, and measurable components of consciousness helps us understand how conscious states are instantiated and modulated in the brain. It does not yet explain why or how these physical processes give rise to subjective experience at all. The hard problem remains untouched: how does inanimate matter like neurons, ions, and electrical gradients become subjective experience? How does mechanism become meaning, or signal become sensation?
The distinction you note between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness is precisely where the mystery lies. Neuroscience has become increasingly adept at mapping access consciousness. What can be reported, measured, disrupted, or restored. But phenomenal consciousness, the “what it is like” of experience, remains irreducible to description. Naming the parts does not dissolve the whole.
This is not a criticism of neuroscience; it is an acknowledgment of its current epistemic boundary. Explaining the mechanisms of vision does not explain redness. Explaining network integration does not explain subjectivity. And this is where contemplative traditions, poetry, paradox, and silence enter, not as competitors to science, but as complementary ways of pointing toward what cannot yet be captured semantically.
Zen koans, Sufi stories, and similar traditions do not aim to explain consciousness; they aim to reorient perception. They invite a procedural shift rather than a conceptual one. I will be writing a blog on this soon on why transcendence may not be graspable semantically but only be approachable experientially. A taster: it will refer to the Advaitic distinction between vyavahaarika (empirical) and parmaarthikaa (underlying) sataa (reality)
My reason for writing this blog was that we sometimes mistake increasingly sophisticated descriptions for explanations. Objective detail can feel like depth of understanding. Mechanism can masquerade as meaning. Yet the gap between neural activity and lived experience remains as vast as ever.
I see our positions as adjacent rather than opposed; nine blind men touching an elephant and coming up with different ways of sensing and describing. Neuroscience tells us a great deal about the scaffolding of consciousness. Contemplative traditions remind us that scaffolding is not the same as inhabiting the space it supports.
Both matter. Neither is sufficient alone. Perhaps the dragons lives in that gap.
As for neurology and psychiatry working together, I remember being told very early on in PGI as a psychiatry trainee that if we observed altered consciousness (sensorium) in a patient we should call a neurologist. It wasn’t a psychiatric problem! It is remarkable how little psychiatry engages with the concept of consciousness.
Fortunate in its freedom from the need for metaphysical consensus, openness to multiple interpretations, and focus on refining predictions rather than seeking ultimate truth, neuroscience (like science as whole) seems well suited in the debate over understanding consciousness. For the same reasons, however, I doubt neuroscience ultimately allowing us to see the "ghost". Perhaps Dennett’s position of labeling the "ghost" as an illusion would make observable correlates and functions sufficient for a practical understanding of consciousness.
If there were neuroscientific maps of consciousness drawn by these philosophers and scientists with the label 'Here be dragons,' my bet would be on Nagel’s representation as the most accurate depiction.
Thank you for this beautifully written exploration of the "ghost".
Thank you Biniyam. The Germans have a wonderful world called Unwelt, which refers to the unique way each creature perceives the world. If you haven't read it, I strongly recommend the book An Immense World by Ed Yong, a profound work on the concept of Unwelt and a marvel of science writing. I agree that Nagel gets closest to describing the problem, but not solving it. I plan to write about this in another blog, starting with Wittgenstein's famous statement: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent". Science is debate, discussion and arguement, so should not be silenced. But there is, dare I say, a bit of scientific hubris that confuses mechanism with meaning. The how of something does not explain its why. Watch this space for this discussion in the coming few blogs.
A lot to think about here and many thanks. Is red red because of the actual interaction at the quantum level as well? So within Nature there is a wavelength that aligns to red because of the intrinsic quantum nature of light but also our correctly aligned measuring device?
Can conscientiousness be a set of “facts” in terms of picture that we can quickly put together to recall events, and mini-films, that can then help us determine the next thought or actions.
Vinod, I cant answer the quantum question, but Daniel Dennett’s view is that consciousness has evolved for survival. Describing the function or purpose of consciousness still does not describe its nature. It is the “is-ness” of being that is the mystery here. Being evolved by evolutionary processes is mechanism, not meaning. But thank you for engaging. I dont have any answers; I am just exploring the limits of questions that can be asked.
Swaran. enjoying your learned explorations and expressions. Thanks for sharing.
While reading your blog, some of Sri Aurobindo' lines from Savitri, his epic poem, came to mind...
" The universe is an endless masquerade:
For nothing here is what it seems,
It is a dream-fact vision of a truth
Which but for the dream would not be wholly true,
A phenomenon stands out significant
Against dim backgrounds of eternity;
We accept its face and pass by all it means;
A part is seen, we take it for the whole."
(CW Vol 28, Book 1
Canto IV
The Secret Knowledge)
Page 61)
Further on pg 68, he says
"A wanderer in a world his thoughts have made,
He turns in a chiaroscuro of error and truth
To find a wisdom that on high is his......"
"His own self's truth he seeks who is the Truth
He is the Player who became the play
He is the Thinker who became the thought,
He is the many who was the silent One."
Worth exploring this
Canto IV as it has packed in a lot. Happy adventure ahead!
Thank you very much Thakore. This is a recurrent theme in all contemplative traditions. Upanishads speak about the difference between व्यवहारिक सता (empirical reality) and परमार्थिक सत्ता (underlying reality). Plato describes it as a cave. And now quantum mechanism describes it as consciousness being fundamental. I plan to write about what little I understand and what makes sense to me so far. Thank you so much for engaging.
Even without invoking the brain, the recognition of comorbidity has moved diagnosis from a set of Aristotelian categories to a phenomenological cartography, with fuzzy boundaries between adjacent syndromes.
David, I will be writing at a later stage about the limits we have reached in applying Aristotelian logic to complex problems. Are you reading my mind by any chance?
☺️However, logic has come a long way since Aristotle but is sadly no longer part of a liberal education, so psychiatrists often don’t appreciate what it can do.
Neurologists conceptualize consciousness as comprising two major components: the level of consciousness (arousal or wakefulness) and the content of consciousness (awareness of self and environment). The level of consciousness is regulated by subcortical structures, primarily the ascending reticular activating system in the brainstem and thalamus, which maintain alertness and wakefulness. The content of consciousness is mediated by widespread cortical and subcortical networks that process sensory input, memory, emotion, and executive functions, allowing for perception, attention, and self-awareness.
Clinically, consciousness is assessed by evaluating both arousal (e.g., response to stimuli) and awareness (e.g., purposeful behavior, communication). Disorders of consciousness are classified based on these components, including coma (loss of both arousal and awareness), vegetative state (arousal without awareness), and minimally conscious state (minimal but definite awareness). Recent neuroimaging and electrophysiological studies have identified specific neural correlates and network dynamics underlying conscious states, emphasizing the integration of thalamocortical and frontoparietal circuits.
Neurologists also recognize that consciousness is a dynamic process, with nonlinear transitions and large-scale network interactions, and that both implicit and explicit memory systems contribute to the conscious experience. The distinction between phenomenal consciousness (subjective experience) and access consciousness (reportable, measurable awareness) is central to both clinical and research approaches.
Is this a filed where neurology and psychiatry can collaborate Swaran paaji?
Dear Sudip
Thank you for such a careful, thoughtful engagement. I agree that clinically and operationally the distinction between arousal and awareness has been enormously useful. It demarcates disorders of consciousness in a clinically relevant manner. Where I would gently diverge is not on the accuracy of this account, but on what it ultimately explains.
Describing neural correlates, network dynamics, and measurable components of consciousness helps us understand how conscious states are instantiated and modulated in the brain. It does not yet explain why or how these physical processes give rise to subjective experience at all. The hard problem remains untouched: how does inanimate matter like neurons, ions, and electrical gradients become subjective experience? How does mechanism become meaning, or signal become sensation?
The distinction you note between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness is precisely where the mystery lies. Neuroscience has become increasingly adept at mapping access consciousness. What can be reported, measured, disrupted, or restored. But phenomenal consciousness, the “what it is like” of experience, remains irreducible to description. Naming the parts does not dissolve the whole.
This is not a criticism of neuroscience; it is an acknowledgment of its current epistemic boundary. Explaining the mechanisms of vision does not explain redness. Explaining network integration does not explain subjectivity. And this is where contemplative traditions, poetry, paradox, and silence enter, not as competitors to science, but as complementary ways of pointing toward what cannot yet be captured semantically.
Zen koans, Sufi stories, and similar traditions do not aim to explain consciousness; they aim to reorient perception. They invite a procedural shift rather than a conceptual one. I will be writing a blog on this soon on why transcendence may not be graspable semantically but only be approachable experientially. A taster: it will refer to the Advaitic distinction between vyavahaarika (empirical) and parmaarthikaa (underlying) sataa (reality)
My reason for writing this blog was that we sometimes mistake increasingly sophisticated descriptions for explanations. Objective detail can feel like depth of understanding. Mechanism can masquerade as meaning. Yet the gap between neural activity and lived experience remains as vast as ever.
I see our positions as adjacent rather than opposed; nine blind men touching an elephant and coming up with different ways of sensing and describing. Neuroscience tells us a great deal about the scaffolding of consciousness. Contemplative traditions remind us that scaffolding is not the same as inhabiting the space it supports.
Both matter. Neither is sufficient alone. Perhaps the dragons lives in that gap.
As for neurology and psychiatry working together, I remember being told very early on in PGI as a psychiatry trainee that if we observed altered consciousness (sensorium) in a patient we should call a neurologist. It wasn’t a psychiatric problem! It is remarkable how little psychiatry engages with the concept of consciousness.
Fortunate in its freedom from the need for metaphysical consensus, openness to multiple interpretations, and focus on refining predictions rather than seeking ultimate truth, neuroscience (like science as whole) seems well suited in the debate over understanding consciousness. For the same reasons, however, I doubt neuroscience ultimately allowing us to see the "ghost". Perhaps Dennett’s position of labeling the "ghost" as an illusion would make observable correlates and functions sufficient for a practical understanding of consciousness.
If there were neuroscientific maps of consciousness drawn by these philosophers and scientists with the label 'Here be dragons,' my bet would be on Nagel’s representation as the most accurate depiction.
Thank you for this beautifully written exploration of the "ghost".
Thank you Biniyam. The Germans have a wonderful world called Unwelt, which refers to the unique way each creature perceives the world. If you haven't read it, I strongly recommend the book An Immense World by Ed Yong, a profound work on the concept of Unwelt and a marvel of science writing. I agree that Nagel gets closest to describing the problem, but not solving it. I plan to write about this in another blog, starting with Wittgenstein's famous statement: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent". Science is debate, discussion and arguement, so should not be silenced. But there is, dare I say, a bit of scientific hubris that confuses mechanism with meaning. The how of something does not explain its why. Watch this space for this discussion in the coming few blogs.
A lot to think about here and many thanks. Is red red because of the actual interaction at the quantum level as well? So within Nature there is a wavelength that aligns to red because of the intrinsic quantum nature of light but also our correctly aligned measuring device?
Can conscientiousness be a set of “facts” in terms of picture that we can quickly put together to recall events, and mini-films, that can then help us determine the next thought or actions.
Vinod, I cant answer the quantum question, but Daniel Dennett’s view is that consciousness has evolved for survival. Describing the function or purpose of consciousness still does not describe its nature. It is the “is-ness” of being that is the mystery here. Being evolved by evolutionary processes is mechanism, not meaning. But thank you for engaging. I dont have any answers; I am just exploring the limits of questions that can be asked.